I have not returned to this subject for some time, but still think that the later portions of this paper expose a meaningful distinction between the way security and punishment deterr criminal behavior differently.
Abstract:
This paper attempts to complete the laissez faire analysis of cybercrime begun by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Project presented at George Mason University in the Spring 2005 semester. First, a five section analytical outline is presented which organizes the CIP material in a cohesive manner. By concluding the analytical outline this paper hopes to define and explain the justification for laissez faire policy promotion by using the CIP presented material as its foundation. Two critical areas expanded beyond the CIP material include distinctions made between ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms of enforcing justice and the unavoidable differences of enforcement at play in the context of intellectual v. tangible property claims. By filling in these implied but missing aspects of analysis this paper hopes to strengthen the case for laissez faire policy suggestions in both the cybercrime context and beyond.